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The Fairness Doctrine and Access to Reply
To Product Commercials
The relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services
does not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas.
-Bigelow v. Virginia (1975)
The Federal Communications Commission recently announced a
major change in fairness doctrine policy.' In its 1974 Fairness Report
on the Handling of Public Issues,' the Commission stated that the fair-
ness doctrine will no longer apply to advertisements for commercial
products or services.' This note examines the Commission's new policy
pronouncement against the statutory and constitutional parameters of
the fairness doctrine. The note will demonstrate that the FCC is not
free to insulate standard product advertising from fairness obligations.4
Rather the Constitution and the first amendment principles embodied in
the public interest standard of the Communications Act5 require applica-
tion of the fairness doctrine to certain categories of product commercials.
1 In its Notice of Inquiry, In the Matter of the Handling of Public Issues Under the
Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 30 F.C.C.2d
26 (1971), the Commission observed that almost 22 years had passed since the fairness doc-
trine last received comprehensive consideration and that the time had come for reassessment
and clarification of basic policy.
2 Fairness Doctrine and Public Interest Standards, Fairness Report Regarding Handling
of Public Issues, 39 Fed. Reg. 26372 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FAnu;Ess REPoarr]; recon-
sidered, 36 P & F RADIO REG. 2d 1021 (1976).
3 See notes 36-42 infra & text accompanying which explore in detail the Commission's
treatment of product advertisements.
4 The Commission's Fairness Report is presently being challenged in the District of
Columbia Circuit Court. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, Civ. No.
74-1700 (D.C. Cir., filed 1976).
Shortly after the Fairness Report was issued, the Commission reaffirmed its refusal to
apply the fairness doctrine to product advertisements by rejecting a demand that a Maine
television station provide reply time to counter snowmobile advertising. Peter C. Herbst,
48 F.C.C.2d 614 (1974), aff'd sub nom. Public Interest Research Group v. FCC, 34 P & F
RADIO REGo. 2d 1375 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3527 (U.S. March 22, 1976).
Although the court referred to the 1974 Fairness Report in sustaining the ruling, it did not
take into account certain recent developments which affect the application of the fairness
doctrine to product advertising. See notes 69-92 infra & text accompanying.
5 The Federal Communications Commission and its predecessor, the Federal Radio Com-
mission, were established to allocate frequencies among competing applicants in a manner
responsive to the "public interest, convenience, and necessity." Radio Act of 1927, § 4, 44
Stat. 1163. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§303(f), 307(a), 307(d), 309(a),
316(a) (1970) 310(d) (Supp. 1976). For the legislative history of broadcast regulation, see
FCC v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 n.1 (1940).
THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
In light of recent developments pertaining to general access, this
attempt by the FCC to limit the scope of the fairness doctrine takes
on particular significance. General access refers to the claim that there
is implicit in the first amendment a public right to use or purchase broad-
cast time to voice opinions on public issues. The fairness doctrine, on
the other hand, confers a limited right of access as a result of the two
affirmative obligations it imposes upon the broadcast licensee. In order
to comply with the fairness requirement, the licensee must devote a
reasonable percentage of time to the coverage of issues of public impor-
tance; and his coverage of these issues must be fair in the sense that it
provides an opportunity for the presentation of contrasting points of
view.8 Access under the fairness doctrine to express a viewpoint there-
6 The Commission's first general statement on fairness, announcing the doctrine's two
affirmative obligations, was presented in Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C.
1246 (1949). H storically, the fairness doctrine has evolved from FCC policies relating
to the broadcaster's social responsibility to the present day statutory mandate under the
Communications Act.
The concept of fairness was regarded as an implicit element in the public interest stan-
dard. Great Lakes Broadcasting Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32, 33 (1929), rev'd on other
grounds, 37 F.2d 993, cert. denied, 281 U.S. 706 (1930). See also Trinity Methodist Church,
South v. F.R.C., 62 F.2d 850 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 599 (1933) and Young People's
Assn. for the Propogation of the Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938). Initially, the fairness criterion
for judging compliance with the public interest standard required that the licensee cover
fairly the views of others, but refrain from expressing his own personal views. Mayflower
Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 339-40 (1940). With the 1949 Report, however, the
Commission reversed its stance and decided to permit licensee editorializing; the neutrality
criterion was replaced with a standard of fair presentation of issues.
In 1959 the fairness doctrine was given statutory recognition when Congress amended
§ 315(a) of the Communications Act to exempt news programs from the equal time require-
ment. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970) provides as follows:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities
to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station:
Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material
broadcast under the provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed under this
subsection upon any licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate.
Appearance by a legally qualified candidate on any-
(1) bona fide newscast,
(2) bona fide news interview,
(3) bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is nci-
dental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news docu-
mentary), or
(4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited
to political conventions and activities incidental thereto), shall not be deemed to
be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning of this subsection. Nothing in
the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, in connection
with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news documentaries, and on-
the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under
this Act to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable opportunity for
the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance. (Emphasis added.)
The 1959 amendment has been interpreted as vindicating the Commission's view that the
fairness doctrine inhered in the public interest standard. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969).
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fore exists only after a station has presented one side of a controver-
sial issue."
The fairness doctrine, while in part modeled on the explicit statutory provisions relating
to political candidates, should be distinguished from the equal time provision. "Equal time"
applies only to personal appearances by candidates for public office and requires the broad-
caster, who has provided time for one political candidate, to also provide time for his
opponents. Under the equal time provision, the broadcaster's role is passive; unless reply
time is requested, the station is not required to furnish it. Nor is the station required to
grant equal opportunity to an opponent who is unwilling to pay. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1970),
as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 315(b) (Supp. 1975).
In contrast, the fairness doctrine is broader in scope; it imposes an affirmative duty
upon the broadcaster to encourage various viewpoints on issues, and it requires only a
reasonable balance instead of equal time. It is also important to note that the general
fairness requirement does not give a particular individual or group the right to obtain
broadcast time. Under the fairness doctrine as it applies generally to controversial issues
of public importance, the viewpoint itself, rather than any particular proponent of it, must
be given exposure. Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C. 576, 577 (1963). Exceptions to
this are the personal attack and political editorializing rules, two aspects of the fairness
doctrine which were codified into FCC regulations. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598,
73.679 (1971) (all identical). (The portion of the Commission's inquiry dealing with the
application of the fairness doctrine to political broadcast was released earlier in First Re-
port-Handling of Political Broadcast, 36 F.C.C.2d 40 (1972)).
The Commission recently extended the fairness obligation to cable television operators
who control their own channels. Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972).
7 The only aspect of the fairness doctrine which is subject to review is the broadcaster's
obligation to provide a reasonable opportunity for opposing viewpoints. The Commission
regards the broadcaster's responsibility under the first aspect of the fairness doctrine-his
affirmative obligation to provide coverage of important public issues-as a matter of jour-
nalistic discretion. FAnmEss REPORT at 26375.
In addition, considerable deference is given the broadcaster throughout the review
process, with the burden almost always on the complainant. The agency acts only on the
basis of complaints from interested citizens; it does not monitor broadcasts for possible
violations. Id. at 26374. Citizen complaints must also comply with rather stringent "plead-
ing" requirements prescribed by the Fairness Doctrine Primer, 40 F.C.C. 598 (1964). The
complainant must specify:
(1) the particular station involved; (2) the particular issue of a controversial
nature discussed over the air; (3) the date and time when the program was carried;
(4) the basis for the claim that the station has presented only one side of the ques-
tion; and (5) whether the station has afforded, or plans to afford, an opportunity
for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints.
Id. at 600. Then there must be prima facie evidence of a violation before a complaint is
even forwarded to the licensee for comments. Allen C. Phelps, 21 F.C.C.2d 12 (1969).
Following this initial screening of complaints, the Commission reviews the broadcast
licensee's response to see: (1) whether the issue specified in the complaint was actually
raised in the licensee's programming; (2) whether the issue is "controversial" and of "public
importance;" and (3) whether the licensee has afforded a "reasonable opportunity" in his
overall programming for the presentation of contrasting points of view. FAimrss Rn, oar
at 26376-77. The Commission's review is limited to a determination of whether the broad-
caster's decision was reasonable and made in good faith. FAIrNEss REPoRT at 26375.
Hence, the broadcaster has considerable leeway in determining what specific issue was
raised by his programming and whether the issue was "controversial" and of "public im-
portance." Only in the rarest instances will his judgment be disturbed. See notes 106-08
infra & text accompanying. This ability to define the issue being raised gives rise to a
strategy often employed against fairness complaints. The broadcaster can simply argue that
the alleged issue was merely a sub-issue in the program, or define the issue differently than
does the complaint.
If the broadcast licensee has presented one side of a controversial issue, he is not re-
quired to provide a forum for opposing views on the same program or series of programs,
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The claim for a general right of access to the media8 grew out of
the Supreme Court's decision in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC'
upholding the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine.10 Red Lion held
that the first amendment, as it applies to the broadcast media, imposes
affirmative obligations upon government to protect freedom of speech
from the evils of private censorship. Seizing upon this interpretation
of the first amendment, consumer advocates advanced a general right of
but is merely expected to afford a proper balance in his overall programming. FAIRNfESs
REPORT at 26374. Nor is he required to present every possible viewpoint or shade of opinion,
regardless of its significance. Id. at 26377.
The broadcaster's duty does include providing free time if paid sponsorship is unavail-
able. This principle, which was first announced in Cullman Broadcasting Co., 40 F.C.C.
576 (1963), was confirmed in the FAu;Ess REPORT at 26377 n.13. The licensee must also
make "reasonable allowance for the presentation of opposing views by genuine partisans
who actually believe in what they are saying." Id. at 26377-78. If a licensee fails to pre-
sent an opposing viewpoint on the ground that no appropriate spokesperson is available, he
must demonstrate that he made a diligent effort to communicate his willingness to present
their views. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 34 F.C.C.2d 773 (1972).
Apart from these minimal standards of fairness, however, the licensee has almost com-
plete discretion on all matters concerning the particular opposing views to be presented and
the appropriate spokesperson and format for their presentation-subject, that is, to the test
of reasonableness and good faith. The broadcaster has substantial discretion in determining
the amount of time to be allotted to each viewpoint, there being no requirement that the
balancing presentation be as long as the original presentation. See FAiRNESS REPORT at
26378. Similarly, the licensee is free to determine format and placement in prime versus
non-prime time, since there is no rigid requirement that he balance audience size, identity,
or other factors. Id.
The history of the fairness doctrine also evidences the Commission's reluctance to im-
pose harsh sanctions for fairness doctrine violations. The Conimission has wide-ranging
powers to discipline licensees. These include denial of renewal at the expiration of a license
period, 47 U.S.C. § 307(d); immediate revocation of a license, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a); proba-
tionary renewal of a license, 47 U.S.C. § 307(d); ordering a comparative hearing, 47 U.S.C.
§309(e); imposing fines, 47 U.S.C. §502; and issuing cease and desist orders, 47 U.S.C.
§ 312(b).
Yet no license has ever been revoked on the basis of a fairness doctrine violation, and
only once has the FCC refused to renew a license on fairness doctrine grounds. In Brandy-
wine-Main Line Radio, Inc., 24 F.C.C.2d 18 (1970), petition for reconsideration denied, 27
F.C.C.2d 565 (1971), aff'd, 473 F.2d 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973),
the denial followed persistent and willful violations and was based on procedural as well
as substantive grounds.
The most common disciplinary procedure used by the Commission is a simple request
that the station correct its practices. See, e.g., Richard G. Ruff, 19 F.C.C.2d 838 (1969).
A similar procedure known as the "lifted eyebrow" technique consists of a warning that a
copy of the letter notifying the licensee that he has violated the fairness doctrine will be
attached to his file for consideration at renewal time.
8The argument for a public right of access was first advanced by Professor Jerome
Barron. See J. BARRo~r, FREEDOM OF THE PREss FOR WHoM? (1973); Barron, An Emerging
First Amendment Right of Access to the Media, 37 Gno. WAsH. L. REv. 487 (1969); Barron,
Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HEwv. L. REv. 1641 (1967).
9395 U.S. 367 (1969).
loAlthough Red Lion dealt specifically with the fairness rules on personal attacks and
political editorials, the opinion is generally cited as upholding the FCC's authority to exer-
cise substantive control over licensees.
3" See notes 46--50 infra & text accompanying.
19761
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
access to the mass media as practically and constitutionally necessary to
protect the public's interest in robust debate.1 2
Whatever its merits,"3 the claim for general access has now been
laid to rest. In Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee, 4 a majority of the Supreme Court held that neither
the Communications Act nor the first amendment required broadcasters
to accept paid editorial advertisements.' 5  While in dictum the Court
suggested that it would be permissible for the Commission to impose a
general right of access,' 6 this alternative was explicitly rejected by the
FCC. The 1974 Fairness Report concluded that a scheme of govern-
ment-dictated access would be both impractical and undesirable."7 -
Now that the CBS decision and the Commission have effectively
denied the claim for general access, the only channel remaining open for
controversial speakers is the limited right of access available under the
fairness doctrine. It is in this context that the Commission has sought
to restrict the fairness doctrine by removing product advertisements
from its scope.
1 2 The claim for general access rejects the traditional view of the free speech and free
press clauses, namely, that a forum exists in this country for all those who wish to be
heard and that the first amendment guards against government censorship. Rather, the access
argument is predicated on Red Lion's view that the first amendment prohibits any inter-
ference with the free flow of ideas. The normal parameters of a free marketplace, such as
freedom of entry and a multitude of sellers, do not exist in the broadcast industry. The
electronic media is instead characterized by monopolistic concentrations of control and same-
ness of programming due to economic factors which favor some classes of ideas over others
and limit the variety of ideas that will be broadcast. Recognition of these impediments to
the self-correcting process of the marketplace of ideas combines with the notion that the
electronic media has special impact. Access proponents argue that the test for whether a
restraint on expression actually is present should focus, not on the availability of alterna-
tive forums, but on the opportunities to secure expression in the media with the largest
impact. In sum, they argue that because of imperfections in the marketplace of ideas,
owners of the media have become the real sources of censorship and that affirmative action
on the part of government is therefore necessary to counteract this imbalance. But see The
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (Florida print media statute
similar to the fairness doctrine held unconstitutional).
13 For an appraisal of the access argument, see Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine
in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. Rv. 1
(1973). A bibliography of the access literature is presented in id. at 2-3 n.5 & 5 n.21.
14412 U.S. 94 (1973).
15Two groups, the Democratic National Committee and Business Executives' Move for
Vietnam Peace, argued that the general policy of certain broadcast stations of not selling
any editorial advertising time to those wishing to speak out on public issues violated the
Communications Act and the first amendment. Their constitutional claim required a show-
ing that (1) private broadcast licensees were engaged in state action and (2) their policy
of refusing editorial advertisements substantially violated the first amendment. A majority
of the Supreme Court agreed that the plaintiffs failed on the second point because the
existence of the fairness doctrine and the balanced coverage it requires is sufficient to pro-
tect the public's interest in free expression. The state action issue was left unresolved. See
note 43 infra.
16412 U.S. 94, 119, 131-32 (1973).
17 FAmNss RaPoRT at 26382-83.
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APPLICATION OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE
TO COMMERCIAL ADVERTISEmENTS
The Commercial Cases
Despite some early indications that commercials might trigger fair-
ness considerations,"8 the first application of the fairness doctrine to
product advertising came in 1967 when the Commission sustained John
Banzhaf's complaint against a station's presentation of only one side of
the cigarette controversy.' 9 The Commission rejected the broadcaster's
argument that only cigarette commercials presenting an affirmative health
claim should be subject to the fairness doctrine. The agency instead
adopted the position that cigarette commercials in general, as opposed
to any particular ad, necessarily convey the controversial view that smok-
ing is desirable.2 The Commission's definition of the issue as the de-
sirability, not the safety, of smoking led to the blanket ruling against
all cigarette ads, and seemed to pave the way for an expansive applica-
tion of the fairness doctrine to product commercials in general."'
To guard against such an extension of its ruling, the Commission
took pains to characterize cigarettes as a "unique product."22 This char-
acterization was further underscored by the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court in Banzhaf v. FCC.' In affirming the cigarette ruling, the
court reiterated the position that, although product commercials gen-
erally are not within the reach of the fairness doctrine, its application
was warranted in Banzhaf because documented evidence showed the
product to be a "threat to life itself."'  The Commission had looked to
1 8 See Sam Morris, 11 F.C.C. 197 (1946). The Commission has been concerned with
advertising almost since federal regulation began, but traditionally its role has been con-
fined to regulating excessive advertising and commercials with loud volume. See genrally
Ramey, The FCC and Broadcast Advertisng: An Anawytcat Review, 20 FED. Comm~.
B.J. 71 (1966).
19 Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967).2 0 Station WCBS-TV (Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising),
9 F.C.C.2d 921, 939, 946 (1967) (memorandum opinion affirming earlier Banzhaf ruling).
21Id. at 953-54 (Loevinger, concurring).
22 We stress that our holding is limited to this product---cigarettes. Governmental
and private reports (e.g., the 1964 Report of the Surgeon General's Committee) and
congressional action (e.g., the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of
1965) assert that normal use of this product can be a hazard to the health of
millions of persons.
Station WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381, 381-82 (1967).
23405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
24 The D.C. Circuit Court stated:
The dangers cigarettes may pose to health ... is a danger inherent in the normal
use of the product, not one merely associated with its abuse or dependent on inter-
vening fortuitous events. It threatens a substantial body of the population, not
merely a peculiarly susceptible fringe group. Moreover, the danger, though not
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the public interest standard as authorization for the fairness doctrine's
application to commercial messages ;2 the court, on the other hand, nar-
rowed the "public interest" test to a "public health" test.2"
Several years later, when the Commission was challenged for its
refusal to extend the cigarette ruling, the same court rejected the "unique
product" distinction. In In re Friends of the Earth," the Commission
dismissed a fairness doctrine complaint against a station for failing to
present balanced coverage on air pollution caused by large combustion
engines. The Commission's attempt to distinguish the cigarette ruling28
was explicitly rejected on appeal.29 The District of Columbia Circuit
Court found sufficient evidence to conclude that the hazards to health
implicit in air pollution were aggravated by such products, and held that
the parallel to Banzhaf was therefore inescapable. 0
While subsequent litigation also failed to support a distinction be-
tween cigarettes and other advertising, unfortunately neither the Com-
mission nor the courts drew very clear lines of demarcation for invok-
ing the fairness doctrine. The Commission stated in one opinion that
the commercial must deal "directly" with a public issue,3' but in an-
established beyond all doubt, is documented by a compelling cumulation of statis-
tical evidence.
Id. at 1097.
25 The ruling is really a simple and practical one, required by the public interest.
The licensee, who has a duty 'to operate in the public interest' . . . is presenting
commercials urging the consumption of a product whose normal use has been
found by Congress and the Government to represent a serious potential hazard to
public health . . . This obligation stems not from any esoteric requirements of a
particular doctrine but from the simple fact that the public interest means nothing
if it does not include such a responsibility.
Station WCBS-TV (Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine to Cigarette Advertising), 9
F.C.C.2d 921, 949 (1967). The Commission had to look to the public interest standard as
authorization for the fairness doctrine's applicability to cigarette commercials. It could not
rely on Congress's endorsement of the doctrine in § 315 because that section refers to news
and public affairs programming and is silent about commercials and entertainment shows.
26405 F.2d 1082, 1096-97.
27 24 F.C.C.2d 743 (1970).
28 The Commission distinguished the cigarette ruling on three related grounds: (1) the
question of automobile use, because it is both beneficial and harmful, is not as simple as
smoking where official government policy urged its complete cessation, (2) the fairness
doctrine ruling on cigarettes was really a substitute for the more desirable action of ban-
ning cigarette ads altogether which the FCC was prohibited by statute from doing, and,
(3) advertising is only peripheral to the important pollution problems, whereas educational
campaigns and restraints on promotion are central in the effort to reduce smoking. Id. at 746.29 Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
30 Id. at 1169.
s'Neckritz, 29 F.C.C.2d 807 (1971), reconsidered, 37 F.C.C.2d 528 (1972), aff'd sub
nom. Neckritz v. FCC, 502 F.2d 411 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The commercials promoted a
Chevron gasoline additive called "F-310" which, the ad claimed, turned dirty smoke into
good, clean mileage. The Commission rejected the contention that the ads were controversial
due to a pending Federal Trade Commission suit because they did not "deal directly with
an issue of public importance." 29 F.C.C.2d at 812.
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other case the agency required fairness balancing when the advertise-
ment dealt with a controversial subject only by inference.8" Yet in a
case where the "directness" standard seemed certain to apply, the FCC
avoided fairness.8 At the appellate level, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court muddied the waters still more by applying the fairness doc-
trine to a commercial which urged shoppers to patronize a store then
subject to a union boycott.8 4 In whatever way this decision is inter-
preted, its extension of the fairness doctrine is troublesome. The deci-
sion may mean that fairness scrutiny is no longer limited to products
involving a health hazard. On the other hand, the court's concern for
national labor policy"s may indicate that the application of the fairness
doctrine is to be tied to the promotion of clearly established govern-
ment policies.
Troubled by these developments and especially the courts' extension
of fairness, the FCC finally moved to regain control over the doctrine's
interpretation. Instead of attempting to distinguish among product com-
mercials, the Commission chose to abandon the cigarette precedent al-
together.
The FCC's 1974 Fairness Report
The Commission's Fairness Report on the Handling of Public Issues
considered three general categories of paid announcements: (1) adver-
tisements which are "editorial" in nature,"8 (2) institutional advertise-
ments which implicitly raise controversial issues of public importance,"7
and (3) advertisements for commercial products or services.
32E.g., Wilderness Society, 30 F.C.C.2d 643 (1971), 31 F.C.C.2d 729 (1971), recon-
sideration denled, 32 F.C.C.2d 714 (1971). The FCC there upheld a fairness complaint
against NBC for airing Standard Oil commercials advocating the need for oil development
in Alaska. Even though the ad did not explicitly mention the Alaskan pipeline, then sub-
ject to debate concerning its environmental impact, the Commission found that the issues
discussed "inherently" raised the pipeline controversy and therefore required fairness bal-
ancing. 30 F.C.C.2d at 646.
33Green, 24 F.C.C.2d 171 (1970), aff'd sub nom. Green v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). The Commission refused to apply the fairness doctrine to military recruitment
ads advocating the desirability of military service, even though at the time of the Vietnam
war this was a hotly debated issue.
34 Retail Store Employees Union, Local 880, R.I.CA. v. FCC, 436 F.2d 248 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
35 436 F.2d at 259.86Also referred to as "advertorials," these are commercials which deal overtly with a
public issue. The Commission gives, as an example, an announcement sponsored by an
organization opposed to abortion which urges a constitutional amendment overriding the
Supreme Court decision legalizing abortion. FAnUMs REPORT at 26380.
37The Commission defines promotional or institutional advertising as advertising de-
signed to present a favorable public image of a particular corporation or industry rather
than to sell a product. Cited as an example were the Standard Oil ads on the Alaskan pipe-
line involved in In re Wilderness Society, 30 F.C.C.2d 643 (1971). FAnuxss REPORT at 26380.
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The Fairness Report did not announce any significant change in
policy with respect to the first two types of advertising. The Commis-
sion said that the fairness doctrine remains fully applicable to commer-
cials which are in fact editorials paid for by the sponsor.38 The Com-
mission also concluded that the fairness doctrine applies to promotional
or institutional advertising when the message bears, even inferentially,
a substantial and obvious relationship to a current, publicly-acknowledged
controversy.3 9
The significance of the 1974 Fairness Report lies in its treatment
of product commercials and explicit rejection of the Banzhaf precedent.
Unless the advertisement affirmatively discusses a controversial public
issue, simple product promotion is no longer subject to the fairness doc-
trine. The Commission concluded:
In the absence of some meaningful or substantive discussion, such as
that found in the "editorial advertisements" referred to above, we do
not believe that the usual product commercial [such as the old ciga-
rette ads] can realistically be said to inform the public on any side
of a controversial issue of public importance.40
The FCC presented four reasons for not applying the fairness
doctrine to product commercials.41 First, it was thought more appro-
priate to refer such matters to Congress for resolution, since the legisla-
ture is better able to develop expert information on whether particular
products are dangerous to health or otherwise detrimental to the public
interest. Second, the Commission believed that application of the fair-
ness doctrine to product advertising would contribute nothing to the
public's understanding of the underlying issue. Rebuttal programming
would at best result in a presentation of the negative side of the product
use issue. The positive side would not be articulated, since the product
commercial only makes the product appear desirable and does not affirma-
tively discuss one side of the underlying issue. Third, fairness review in
this area would force the Commission to interfere with the broadcaster's
first amendment right. The fourth and perhaps most critical considera-
tion was the Commission's reference to advertising's role in preserving
the economic base of the commercial broadcasting system. The agency
was convinced that application of the fairness doctrine to product com-
mercials would have disastrous economic consequences for broadcasting.42
88 The Commission noted that because editorial advertising represents only a small per-
centage of total commercial time, the application of fairness here would not have any serious
effect on station revenues. Id.
89 Id. at 26380-81.
40 d. at 26382.
41 Id. at 26381.
4 2 The adverse economic effect on broadcasting was also cited as a reason for refusing
to apply the fairness doctrine to two categories of advertisements suggested in the Federal
[Vol. 51:756
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Thus, the 1974 Fairness Report has withdrawn standard product
advertisements from the scope of the fairness doctrine by erecting a pre-
sumption that they do not contain any meaningful discussion of public
issues. However, an examination of the statutory and constitutional
parameters of the doctrine will show that the FCC cannot, in fact,
remove all. product advertising from the purview of fairness scrutiny.
As the primary vehicle for protecting the public's interest in free expres-
sion, the fairness doctrine is compelled by the first amendment and is
triggered whenever an issue invokes the public's first amendment right
to know.43 Because the public's right to know under the first amend-
ment now extends to certain categories of commercial speech, the fair-
ness doctrine must likewise apply to such constitutionally protected com-
mercial expression. Furthermore, the Commission's justifications for
isolating product commercials and giving them less protection do not
outweigh the public's interest in hearing opposing views on the use of
controversial products.
Trade Commison's proposal: advertisements that make claims based on scientific premises
that are in dispute and those that are silent about negative.aspects of the touted product.
The FCC noted, in addition, that the fairness doctrine was not the appropriate vehicle
for the correction of false and misleading advertising because:
A Congressionally-mandated remedy for deceptive advertising already exists in the
form of various FTC sanctions. If an advertisement is found to be false or mis-
leading, we believe the propore course is to ban it altogether rather than to make
its claims a subject of broadcast debate.
Id. at 26382.
43The argument that the fairness doctrine is constitutionally compelled is predicated on
an initial finding of the state action necessary to invoke first amendment protection. Mr.
Justice Brennan, dissenting in CBS, advanced a five-prong argument that the position of
the broadcast licensee constitutes state action: (1) public ownership of the airwaves; (2) ex-
tensive governmental control over the broadcast industry; (3) broadcasters' dependence
upon the government for their, right to use air space; (4) government involvement in
broadcaster policy; and (5) analogy to Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 431
(1952) (policy of privately-owned bus company, franchised and regulated by federal gov-
ernment, constituted state action). Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 172-81 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Although Justice Brennan's position was not accepted by the majority in CBS, the
state action issue was otherwise left unresolved by the decision. See note 15 supra. Only
Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting, found state action. Three justices (Burger,
Stewart, and Rehnquist) found no state action. Justice Douglas did not indicate his posi-
tion. Justices Blackmun and Powell stated it was unnecessary to reach the issue. Justice
White was also undecided, but felt that government action might have been present.
In addition, the CBS decision is distinguishable from the issue at hand. CBS in-
volved FCC acquiescence in network policy, whereas the Fairness Report is a positive
agency pronouncement. If authorized under the public interest standard, the new fairness
guidelines have the force of statute and are the equivalent of legislative action.
However, the state action question need not be reached because the same first amend-
ment compulsion is present under the public interest standard of the Communications Act.
The CBS Court stated that the public interest standard requires reference to first amend-
ment principles. 412 U.S. at 122. The alternative argument is that the first amendment
principles embodied in the public interest standard require application of the fairness doc-
trine to certain categories of product advertising. As a matter of statutory interpretation,
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TOWARD A RIGHT OF ACCESS TO REPLY TO PRODUCT COMMERCIALS
The Fairness Doctrine as a Statutory and Constitutional Requirement
If at one time it was merely an administrative rule subject to broad
agency discretion, the fairness doctrine is now a specific statutory re-
quirement under the Communications Act." Red Lion noted that the
1959 amendments to the Act not only codified fairness obligations in
statutory form, but vindicated the position that the fairness doctrine in-
hered in the public interest standard.45 Red Lion and the subsequent
Supreme Court decision in CBS accentuate, moreover, the constitu-
tional underpinnings of the fairness doctrine.
The main holding in Red Lion supported the limited right of access
under the fairness doctrine as an extension of freedom of speech.48 In
recognizing the rights of the public in the allocation of air time, Red
Lion marked a departure from the traditional view of the first amend-
ment.47 Traditional first amendment analysis regards the clauses guar-
anteeing freedom of speech and freedom of the press as limitations on
the power of government. Red Lion rejected this interpretation and held
instead that the first amendment, as applied to the broadcast media, im-
poses affirmative obligations upon government to guard against any
interference with the free flow of ideas:
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
this argument does not rest on a finding of state action. The textual discusion therefore
focuses on the substantive first amendment issues.
44 See note 6 supra.
45Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380 (1969). This position was
reaffirmed in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
110 n.8 (1973).
46Red Lion upheld the constitutionality of the fairness doctrine on the basis of the
right of speakers to express their views:
[A]s far as the First Amendment is concerned those who are licensed stand no
better than those to whom licenses are refused. A license permits broadcasting,
but the licensee has no constitutional right to be the one who holds the license or
to monopolize a radio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens. There is
nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the Government from requiring a
licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or
fiduciary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative
of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the
airwaves.
395 U.S. at 389.
47Red Lion is the landmark case in this area, recognizing for the first time the rights
of nonbroadcasters in the allocation of air time. Prior to Red Lion, the Supreme Court's
consideration of the applicability of the first amendment to broadcasting focused on the
rights of broadcasters only. E.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190
(1943) (technical limitations on the rights of broadcast licensees held constitutional).
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than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by
the Government itself or a private licensee.48
The Court in Red Lion based its finding of affirmative obligations under
the first amendment on what it perceived to be an essential difference
between the print and the broadcast media. The scarcity- of radio fre-
quencies restricts the number of those who would broadcast, whereas
expression by publication is, at least in theory, available to all.4 9 The
Court concluded that fairness limitations on the freedom of the broad-
caster, even those that would be unacceptable when imposed upon other
media, are lawful in order to enhance the public's right to be informed."°
By giving those members of the public whose views should be ex-
pressed a limited right of access to respond to controversial issues, the
fairness doctrine furthers the dual purpose of the first amendment as
interpreted by Red Lion:- to assure that truth will prevail5 and to pro-
tect those forms of expression that will enable the voter to cast an in-
telligent ballot. 2 The fairness doctrine serves these two first amendment
48 395 U.S. at 390.
49 Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted to put
restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this
unique medium. But the people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by
radio and their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the
ends and purposes of the First Amendment.
Id.
5 0 The Red Lion decision referred to the "right of the public to receive suitable access
to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences." Id.
51 The notion that the first amendment should assist in the ascertainment of truth de-
rives from Justice Holmes's concept of a marketplace of ideas:
[Wihen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas--
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
The free exchange of ideas presupposes that competition among ideas will permit truth
to prevail. The first amendment provides free exchange and full diversity of opinion so
that citizens may be exposed to all the relevant considerations and enabled to draw their
own conclusions.5 2 The view that the first amendment's goal is to produce an informed public capable
of conducting its own affairs was also adopted by New York Tines Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), which posited the public's right to "uninhibited, robust, and wide open"
debate on public issues. Id. at 270. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on
"The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. RPv. 191.
This interpretation of the first amendment is usually associated with Alexander Meikle-
john. According to Professor Meiklejohn, the first amendment is concerned with the political
right of self-government. The importance of protecting free communication of information
and opinion is not to protect the right of the speaker, but rather to guard "the freedom
of those activities of thought and communication by which we 'govern'." Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. Rxv. 245, 255. In addition to public dis-
cussion of political issues, Meiklejohn would include education, advancements in philosophy
and the sciences, and literature and the arts among the categories of expression which merit
absolute protection. Id. at 257.
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principles by striking a delicate balance among the interests which com-
pete for broadcast time. At stake are the interest of the broadcaster in
determining what shall be presented by his station, the individual's right
of access to present an opposing view, and the public's interest in robust
debate. By upholding fairness restrictions on the licensee's use of broad-
cast time, Red Lion resolved these competing interests, according to its
view of the first amendment, in favor of the public's right to know.5"
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee further reinforces the
first amendment imperative underlying the fairness doctrine. CBS held
that neither the first amendment nor the statutory public interest stan-
dard compelled broadcasters to sell advertising time to controversial
speakers. A majority of the justices concluded that, even if state action
were found, the licensee's policy of refusing editorial advertisements did
not violate the first amendment because the public's first amendment
right to be fully informed already receives adequate protection under
the fairness doctrine.54 The Court noted that the existing regulatory
scheme seeks to preserve the first amendment values written into the Act
by defining the licensee's role in terms of a "public trustee" charged with
the duty of fairly and impartially informing the listening and viewing
5 3 Red Lion concluded: "It is the right of viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount." 395 U.S. at 390. The public's first amendment right
to know is now widely recognized and has played an increasingly significant role in other
areas of the law. See generally Note, The Listener's Right to Hear in Broadc.sting, 22 STAN.
L. REv. 863 (1970).
Most of the cases have dealt with the analogous right to receive printed material or
information. The right to receive information had its genesis in dictum in Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143, 149 (1943) (right of Jehovah's Witnesses to distribute leaflets
accompanied by willing listeners' right to receive them). Subsequent decisions also treated
it in dictum. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1946) (residents of company-owned
town had same right to be informed as citizens living elsewhere); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (specific rights need not be enumerated in Constitution to be
guaranteed; freedom of speech and press includes right to receive that which is spoken or
printed); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974) (prison rules regulating censorship
of mail held unconstitutional because of interference with prisoners' rights to communicate
and public's right to receive information about prisons). The public's right to receive in-
formation may be outweighed by competing considerations. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753 (1972) (government's interest in barring alien's entrance to country); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (newsmen have same obligations as other citizens before a
grand jury); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (individual's reputational
interest).
The right to receive information may not be invoked when alternative means of com-
munication are available. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) and Saxbe v. Wash-
ington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974), two companion cases upholding prison rules pro-
hibiting face-to-face interviews between inmates and the press without considering the im-
plications of the right. to receive information. More recently, the right to receive informa-
tion has been the basis for challengnig state laws forbidding the advertising of retail pre-
scription drug prices. See note 69 infra.
54 See note 15 supra.
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public.5 5 The importance of the CBS decision is two-fold. CBS not
only reaffirmed the constitutional and statutory bases of the fairness doc-
trine, but, in denying another form of public access to the media, ele-
vated the fairness doctrine as the sole guardian of the public's first
amendment right to know.
The analysis remains the same whether the fairness doctrine is con-
stitutionally compelled or required by the first amendment principles
embodied in the statutory public interest standard.5" The broadcaster's
obligation to assure balanced coverage is present whenever an issue in-
vokes the public's first amendment interests in free expression.
The Public's First Amendment Right to Know and Commercial Speech
The FCC's recent pronouncement on product commercials ad-
heres to the political-commercial speech dichotomy traditionally asso-
ciated with first amendment analysis." On the hierarchial ladder of first
amendment protection, political speech is most favored, while commer-
cial speech is entitled to little, if any, protection. This hierarchy finds
clear expression in the Commission's Fairness Report."8 By subjecting
political issues to the fairness doctrine and thereby requiring more po-
litical issue presentation, the FCC has granted that kind of speech in-
creased protection in accord with the public's first amendment right to
receive public affairs information. Conversely, when the expression is
entitled to less first amendment recognition, as in the case of commercial
speech, it does not receive protection under the fairness doctrine. With
55 412 U.S. 94, 116-17.
56 See note 43 supra.
57 The prevailing justification for the political-commercial speech dichotomy is Alexan-
der Meiklejohn's interpretation of the first amendment. Meiklejoln's self-government theory
of the first amendment leads to the conclusion that commercial speech, because it only seeks
to influence private economic choices and not political behavior, is simply not the type of
speech the first amendment was designed to protect.
The problems with this rationale have been underscored by several critics. See, e.g.,
Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of
Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971); Note, Freedom of Expression in a
Commercial Context, 78 HARv. L. Rnv. 1191 (1965).
One problem is the difficulty in distinguishing the so-called commercial transaction from
speech entitled to protection. Meiklejohn's theory also breaks down with his artistic
speech exception. If artistic speech is protected by the first amendment because it builds a
foundation for intelligent decisionmaking, the same should be true of commercial speech.
See note 111 infra & text accompanying.
5 8 The Commission quotes Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968):
Promoting the sale of a product is not ordinarily associated with any of the
interests the First Amendment seeks to protect As a rule, it does not affect the
political process, does not contribute to the exchange of ideas, does not provide
information on matters of public importance, and is not, except perhaps for the
ad-men, a form of individual self-expression.
FAmxs RESoRT at 26381.
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commercial expression, the public's first amendment right to know is
said to be less significant and hence fairness restrictions on the broad-
caster's first amendment rights cannot be justified.
The political-commercial speech dichotomy, however, has been dis-
credited in recent years. Its demise will be hailed by those who seek
access to reply to product commercials, for if the umbrella of first amend-
ment protection covers commercial speech, the public's first amendment
right to receive information may be sufficient to compel application of
the fairness doctrine to product advertising.
The origins of the political-commercial speech dichotomy can be
traced to an expansive and indeed questionable interpretation of Valen-
tine v. Chrestensen.59 Chrestensen was the first Supreme Court case to
consider the constitutional status of commercial speech. At issue was
the constitutionality of an ordinance which prohibited the distribution
of advertising handbills on the streets.' ° In sustaining the ordinance, the
Supreme Court held that the public streets were not a protected forum
for the dissemination of advertising matter. The narrow holding of the
case, however, was overshadowed by the Court's broad statement that
"the Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising."61  This language was interpreted to
mean that "purely commercial advertising" is not entitled to any first
amendment protection. 2 The celebrated commercial speech doctrine
later emerged from this expansive reading of Chrestensen and eventu-
ally0 found its justification in the self-government theory of the first
amendment.6
59316 U.S. 52 (1942).
60 Chrestensen was arrested for distributing handbills advertising his submarine exhibit.
He had attempted to circumvent the New York City sanitary code by printing a double-
faced handbill. On one side was the submarine exhibit advertisement and on the reverse
side was a protest against the city for not allowing him to exhibit his submarine at a munici-
pal pier. Id. at 53.
61 Id. at 54.
62 The Court distinguished "purely commercial advertising" from "information and
opinion," which is entitled to first amendment protection, by focusing on Chrestensen's
intent. It was evident in this instance that the purpose was one of financial profit and that
the double-faced circular was designed to evade the ordinance. Id. at 55. This standard
has been labeled the "primary purpose test." Redish, The First Amendment in the Market-
place: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GFo. WAsHr. L. REV. 429,
451 (1971). The Chrestensen test of what constitutes purely commercial speech was subse-
quently overruled in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The New York
Times Court held that it was immaterial whether or not the newspaper was paid to print
the particular ad. The Court focused on the content of the advertisement and deemed
commercial that speech which does no more than propose a commercial transaction. Id. at
265-66.63 The original justification was that the commercial speech doctrine regulated conduct
and not speech. The argument was that either advertising itself is conduct and not speech
or that commercial speech is so closely tied to commercial activity, which dearly may be
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Two recent Supreme Court cases, however, signal a return to the
narrow reading of Chrestensen and a departure from the notion that
commercial speech per se is unprotected. In Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,5 the Court upheld an
ordinance prohibiting newspapers from publishing sex-classified help-
wanted advertisements. The Court not only looked to the commercial
nature of the help-wanted ads,6 but also noted that the commercial ac-
tivity proposed by the ads was illegal and that the restriction on the
advertising was "incidental to a valid limitation on economic activity.s 67
These two additional justifications suggest that the commercial nature
of an expression cannot be the single basis for excluding commercial
ads from first amendment protection. Furthermore, in dictum, the Court
indicated that commercial advertising, in some situations, may serve
first amendment interests which could prevail when balanced against
the government's interest in regulation. 8
In the most recent case to deal with these issues, Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia 9 the Supreme Court at last sounded the death knell to the doctrine
regulated, that commercial speech and activity are merged. This rationale has since been
discredited. See Comment, The Right to Receive and the Commercial Speech Doctrine:
New Constitutional Considerations, 63 GEo. L.J. 775, 800 (1975).
4 See note 52 supra.
65413 U.S. 376 (1973).
.8 Id. at 385.
67 Any First Amendment interest which might be served by advertising an ordi-
nary commercial proposal and which might arguably outweigh the governmental
interest supporting the regulation is altogether absent when the commercial activ-
ity itself is illegal and the restriction on advertising is incidental to a valid limita,
tion on economic activity.
Id. at 389.
68The Court rejected the argument that commercial speech should be accorded some
degree of protection in the Pittsburgh Press case. It left to future cases to decide what "the
merits of this contention may be in other contexts" (not involving ads aiding illegal activ-
ity) and suggested that a balancing test would apply. Id. at 388-89.
e9 421 U.S. 809 (1974). Shortly before this note was sent to the printer, the
Supreme Court handed down another landmark decision on the status of commercial
speech. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976), the Court held that commercial speech per se enjoys first
amendment protection.
At issue was a Virginia statute which prohibited licensed pharmacists from adver-
tising the prices of prescription drugs. A consumer group challenged the statute's con-
stitutionality under the first amendment. Justice Blackmun, speaking for the majority,
concluded that the public's right to receive information on prescription drug prices was
of paramount importance. The state's interest in maintaining the professionalism of its
licensed pharmacists could not justify the ban on advertising prescription drug prices. 96
S. CL at 1828-30.
The Court discussed at length the public's first amendment interests in the free
flow of commercial information. These interests are present even in the pure commercial
speech situation, such as prescription drug advertising, which does no more than propose
a commercial transaction. For this reason, the Court declined to draw any line between
publically important commercial advertising and the opposite kind. Instead, the Court
held that all commercial speech is protected by the first amendment, provided it dis-
seminates truthful information about lawful activity. Id. at 1826-27, 1830-31.
197,61
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that commercial speech per se is unprotected. As managing editor of a
weekly newspaper in Virginia, Bigelow had published an ad for a New
York City organization announcing that it would arrange for abor-
tions.7 He was convicted of violating a Virginia statute which made it
a misdemeanor to encourage or prompt the procuring of an abortion,
by sale or circulation of any publication.7 Bigelow had argued that the
statute violated his right to publish freely and that it was overbroad
because it swept within its scope speech protected by the first amend-
ment. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the statute as applied
to Bigelow was unconstitutional."'
In this landmark opinion, the Court affirmed the principle that com-
mercial advertising enjoys a degree of first amendment protection. In-
deed, the Court made it clear that speech is not stripped of first amend-
ment protection merely because it appears in the form of paid commer-
cial advertisements or merely because it has commercial overtones or
reflects the advertiser's pecuniary interests."8 Regardless of how the
speech is labeled, be it commercial advertising or solicitation, the sub-
stance of the expression and not its form is controlling.74 Acknowledg-
Although this decision takes Bigelow one step further in avowing blanket protection
for commercial speech, Bigelow is likely to retain an important role for future cases. The
analysis suggested by Bigelow is still instructive for fairness doctrine purposes. Also,
the balancing test elucidated by Bigelow provides guidance in determining the relative
merits of the various competing interests.
7o UNWANTED PREGNANCY
LET US HELP YOU
Abortions are now legal in New York.
There are no residency requirements.
FOR IMMEDIATE PLACEMENT IN ACCREDITED
HOSPITALS AND CLINICS AT LOW COST
Contact
WOMEN'S PAVILION
515 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
or call any time
(212) 371-6670 or (212) 371-6650
AVAILABLE 7 DAYS A WEEK
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL. We will make
all arrangements for you and help you
with information and counseling.
Id. at 812.
71 Se 421 U.S. at 812-13.
T2 421 U.S. 809, 829-36 (Rehnquist & White, J.J., dissenting).
781d. at 818-19. The Court cited New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 266, as standing
for the proposition that the substance of the expression, and not its label, is controlling.
421 U.S. at 820. Commercial speech was distinguished from other categories of speech, such
as fighting words, obscenity, and libel, which have been held unprotected. Id. at 819.
The decision in Chrestensen was regarded as a distinctly limited one upholding a reason-
able regulation of the manner in which commercial advertising could be distributed. Id.
at 819-20. The Court also regarded Pittsburgh Press as giving emphasis to the illegality of
the advertised activity. Id. at 821-22.
74 421 U.S. at 826.
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ing that speech may be commercial "in widely varying degrees,' the
Court also indicated that the extent to which constitutional protection
is afforded commercial advertising must be decided on a case-by-case
basis.7" The approach adopted by the Court was the familiar balancing
test: The first amendment interests in the expression were assessed and
weighed against the public interest allegedly served by the regulation.76
Accordingly, the Court found that the ad in Bigelow did more than
simply propose a commercial transaction. By indicating that abortions
were legal in New York and that there were no residency requirements,
the ad contained factual material of interest to the public and thus served
an important informational function. 77 The Court emphasized that editor
Bigelow's first amendment interest in disseminating information on abor-
tion coincided with the public's first amendment right to receive such
information.78
The Court next looked to the state's countervailing interest in regu-
lating what its citizens may hear or read about the New York services.
The Court concluded that Virginia's interest in preventing commercial
exploitation of women who elect to have an abortion was entitled to
"little, if any, weight" for the reason that the state's police powers do
not reach activities outside its borders.79 A state may not, under the
guise of exercising internal police powers, bar a citizen of another state
from disseminating information about an activity that is legal in that
state.8 0 To uphold such a regulation, moreover, would impose serious
burdens on interstate publications which might impair the proper func-
tioning of a free press.8"
While Bigelow renounced the old commercial speech doctrine, its
mandate for the future is not entirely clear.8 2 The Court refused to adopt
75 The diverse motives, means, and messages of advertising may make speech
"fcommercial" in widely varying degrees. We need not decide here the extent to
which constitutional protection is afforded commercial advertising under all cir-
cumstances and in the face of all kinds of regulation.
Id."
76 Id. at 826-27.
77 Id. at 822.
7 8 The Court noted that Bigelow's prosecution "incurred more serious First Amendment
overtones" because his "interest was augmented by the fact that the statute was applied
against him as publisher and editor of a newspaper, not against the advertiser or a referral
agency or a practitioner." Id. at 828.
79 Id. at 827-28.
801d. at 824-25.
8 
'Id. at 828-29.
8 2 Bigelow also provides some support for the freedom of broadcasters to air commer-
cials of their choosing. A broadcaster could argue that, just as Bigelow's right to publish
was protected, his first amendment right in airing product commercials should not be inter-
fered with by the government's fairness doctrine. Also, the statute in Bigelow, unlike the
fairness doctrine, actually prohibited the publication of the advertisement altogether and
1976].
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the position that commercial speech per se is protected. Instead it adopted
an intermediate position which requires an assessment of the first amend-
ment interests involved in the expression on a case-by-case basis. Such
an ad hoc balancing approach 8 represents a departure from the "defini-
tional balancing" usually associated with first amendment analysis."
Ordinarily, regulations affecting protected expression are tested under
a strict scrutiny standard, in which the state must assert a compelling
interest to justify the infringement. 5 Unfortunately, in Bigelow there
was no occasion to measure the strength of the constitutional protection
that attached to the advertisement because the asserted state interest was
of little import.
Another question left unanswered by the Bigelow decision is the
range of commercial speech entitled to protection. As the dissent points
out, the ad in Bigelow was a classic commercial proposition directed
toward the exchange of services rather than the exchange of ideas."0
The majority's rationale for extending first amendment protection was
that the ad contained information of value to the public on abortion.
The information, moreover, was of potential interest "not only to readers
possibly in need of the services offered, but also to those with a general
curiosity about ... the subject matter or the law of another State and
its development, and to readers seeking reform in Virginia." '
This rationale for extending protection to the Bigelow ad does offer
some guidance. From one perspective, the Court may be pointing to
the distinction between informational advertising and advertising which
is merely repetitive and want-creating. The difficulty with such a dis-
carried a criminal penalty as welL Further, advertisements for abortion services touch on
a constitutional issue and are therefore distinguishable from the ordinary product-service
advertisement.
For a favorable reaction to the Commission's Fairness Report, see Simmons, Commer-
cial Advertising and the Fairness Doctrine: The New F.C.C. Policy in Perspective, 75
COLuIm. L. Rv. 1063 (1975).
83The Court spoke only in general terms as to the test that applies:
Advertising, like all public expression, may be subject to reasonable regulation
that serves a legitimate public interest .... To the extent that commercial activity
is subject to regulation, the relationship of speech to that activity may be one fac-
tor, among others, to be considered in weighing the First Amendment interest
against the governmental interest alleged.
421 U.S. at 826 (citation omitted).84 See generally T. EmmRsoN, TowARD A GENmuL THaoRY or = FxasT AmENDIUrT
(1966).
85 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-83 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(public's right to full and free flow of information underlying freedom of the press); Gib-
son v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) (freedom of
association); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 439 (1963) (freedoms of expression and
association); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) (freedom of association).
86 421 U.S. at 831-32.
87 1 d. at 822.
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tinction is that even the repetitive, want-creating advertisement may also
provide information essential to customers. From another perspective,
however, the decision suggests a more viable distinction. By noting that
the Bigelow ad concerned reform in abortion law, the Court may be
limiting first amendment protection to advertisements for products and
services which are subjects of public debate. Not only is this a more
feasible distinction, but it comports with the Court's previously ex-
pressed view of the first amendment: protected speech is that which
either has a direct relevance to the self-governing decisions a citizen must
make or which in some way better prepares him to make those decisions."
This latter interpretation of Bigelow carries far reaching implica-
tions for the future of the fairness doctrine. The FCC's decision to
remove product commercials from fairness scrutiny was predicated on
the traditional commercial speech doctrine and its notion that the first
amendment protects only political, and not commercial, expression. Bige-
low expressly repudiated that premise. The decision furthermore ac-
knowledged that in some situations advertising for products or services
can have a bearing on political decisions and thus invoke the public's
right to know under the first amendment. If fairness balancing is re-
quired whenever a broadcast presentation deals with an issue in regard
to which the public has a right to receive information, then advertise-
ments which implicate the public's right to know should likewise trigger
the fairness doctrine. At the very least, Bigelow suggests that the FCC
cannot entirely avoid the task of assessing the first amendment interests
involved in commercial expression.
This assessment of the first amendment interests in commercial ex-
pression must begin, as Bigelow indicates, with the self-government
theory of the first amendment. Possible criteria for a "controversial
product" therefore might be whether the product was related to: (1) the
subject of an upcoming public vote or referendum, (2) an election issue
in a campaign for public office, (3) the subject of pending legislation
or legislative hearings on the local, state, or federal level, or (4) the
subject of heated public debate in the station's service area.
These criteria are consistent with the prevailing interpretation of
the first amendment and its goal of securing a fully informed electorate.
They are not substantially different from those factors already set forth
by the Commission to determine a controversial issue of public impor-
tance in other areas of expression in which the fairness doctrine is ap-
plied." The suggested criteria are also specific and narrowly drawn,
88 See note 52 supra & text accompanying.
8 9 See FAna;Ess REPoRT at 26376.
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thus -accomplishing the purpose of the fairness doctrine with minimal
harm to the broadcaster's competing first amendment interestY° The
proposed model, moreover, provides workable boundaries. Certainly it
is more tangible than the FCC's directness standard91 or the discredited
"public interest-public health" test.9 2 The approach suggested here would
in -fact exclude the majority of product-service commercials from the
purview of the fairness doctrine. It would not permit the existence of
an established government policy to determine whether a position should
require fairness rebuttal. Nor would fairness obligations be invoked
merely because an advertisement was false or misleading, or because an
advertisement was arguably informative. Under the proposed criteria,
the use of the touted product must be the subject of debate within the
local, state, or national political arena in order to invoke the fairness
doctrine.
The Competing Considerations
It is not enough to advance the first amendment as grounds for ex-
tending fairness doctrine protection to certain forms of commercial
expression. Bigelozv also calls for a balancing of the competing consid-
erations. The Commission's reasons for excluding product commercials
from fairness scrutiny must be weighed against the public's right to hear
fairness rebuttal. A careful examination indicates that the justifications
cited by the FCC in its Fairness Report do not rise to the level of
a governmental interest compelling enough to support the blanket re-
moval of product advertising from the purview of the fairness doctrine.9"
1. Economic Effects
The Commission's primary justification for its limitation on the
fairness doctrine is that application of the doctrine to product commer-
cials would have an adverse effect on the economic base of the broad-
90 The proposed model also reflects the view of those commentators who have argued
for the need to establish clear standards for measuring licensee performance. See e.g.,
A Fair Break for Controversial Speakers: Limitations of the Fairness Doctrine and the
Need for Individual Access, 39 GEo. WASHa. L. Rav. 532 (1971); Note, The Regulation oJ
Competing First Amendment Rights: A New Fairness Doctrine Balance After CBS?, 122
U. PA. L. Rav. 1283 (1974).
91 See notes 31-33 supra & text accompanying.
9 2 See notes 24-26 & 28-30 supra & text accompanying.
9 3 Even if the expression involved in product advertising does not trigger strict scru-
tiny under the first amendment, the Commission's distinction between editorial and institu-
tional advertising on the one hand and ordinary product advertising on the other may not
be sufficiently compelling to withstand a challenge on equal protection grounds. In dis-
tinguishing standard product commercials from other types of advertising, the Commission
has discriminated in favor of product advertisers, allowing them to air their views without
rebuttal, while others must submit their opinions to public debate under the fairness doc-
trine.
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casting media.94 The adverse effect on broadcast income could conceiv-
ably occur in two ways. 5 One fear is that advertisers will shift their
buying to the nonregulated media rather than subject their product
claims to debate. The other fear is that application of the fairness doc-
trine to product commercials carries the potential for imposing a further
cost on the licensee by its encroachment on commercial and broadcast-
ing time. 6
Both of these contentions are questionable. There is no indication
that counter-ads will necessarily replace time previously sold to adver-
tisers.17 As to the fear that advertisers would abandon broadcasting, the
only available empirical evidence cuts the other way. The amount of
cigarette advertising was not substantially affected by the Banzhaf rul-
ing," which suggests that from the advertiser's point of view the ad-
vantages of using the media with the greatest impact will outweigh the
costs of incurring counter-ads. The dire predictions of network bank-
ruptcy are also predicated on the assumption that fairness would be ex-
tended to countless products without discrimination.99 Under the pro-
posed criteria, however, only a limited number of product commercials
would actually trigger fairness obligations. Whether the broadcast media
could survive the additional cost that might be imposed by counter-
advertising is, in any event, mere speculation, for the extent of the cost
will ultimately depend on which products are found to be controversial.
The most that can be said with confidence is that it is impossible to
predict the effect of future fairness decisions on broadcast income. Con-
sequently, a more plausible solution would be for the FCC to assess
94 The concern for maintaining the institutional viability of the press was recognized
in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
The Court implied that if.an institutional or financial threat to the press could be shown,
it would render unconstitutional an otherwise valid regulation of commercial speech. Id.
at 823-83.
9 5 See Loevinger, The Politics of Advertising, 15 WNr. & MARY L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1973);
Note, And Now A Word Against Our Sponsor: Extending the FCC's Fairness Doctrine
to Advertising, 60 CA ir. L. R-v. 1416, 1444-49 (1972).
98Under the principle in Cullman Broadcasting Co., Inc., 40 F.C.C. 576 (1963), the
broadcaster must bear the cost of reply programming if paid sponsorship is not found.
Because few consumer groups can afford the cost of sponsoring any counter-programming,
the *licensee not only pays for most of this programming, but, it is argued, gives up air
time that other paying advertisers might buy.
9 7 If counter-advertising does not replace time previously sold to advertisers, there
admittedly may be some deterioration of broadcast programming. Counter-ads would
force some reduction in expenses and this would most likely occur in the area of news and
public affairs programming, where costs are disproportionate to the time involved. See
Loevinger, The Politics of Advertising, 15 Wmx. & MARY L. Rav. 1, 10-11 (1973).9 8 The miniscule effect of the Banzhaf ruling on the amount of cigarette advertising
is documented in Note, And Now A Word Against Our Sponsor: Extending the FCCs
Faimess Doctrine to Advertising, 60 CALIF. L. R v. 1416, 1446 n. 172 (1972).
99 See, e.g., Simmons, Commercial Advertising and The Fairness Doctrine: The New FCC
Policy in PersPective, 75 CoLuM. L. Rav. 1083, 1110-13 (1975).
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the impact of counter-advertising on a case-by-case basis as the need
arises.
2. Administrative Difficulties
The Fairness Report pointed to the number of product commercials
and the potential fairness disputes that might arise as another reason for
refusing to apply the doctrine to this area. The Commission concluded
that the solution should therefore rest with the legislature.
Admittedly, practical difficulties in implementation exist, but the
problems are not insurmountable. Criteria for defining a controversial
product have already been outlined. Moreover, by permitting fairness
review of institutional advertising, the Commission may merely have
generated administrative problems as serious as those associated with a
review of product commercials. The line between institutional adver-
tising and simple product promotion is not always clear."° Yet the
FCC will now have to make those fine distinctions because such vastly
different consequences are triggered according to the label which is
affixed to a given commercial. The model suggested here for applying
the fairness doctrine to product advertising would not cause greater
administrative burdens than those which would accompany the Commis-
sion's attempt to apply a categorical distinction.
3. Dangers of Extended Governmental Control
The danger of extending government regulation and control over
the broadcasting industry is another concern which shaped the FCC's
decision. Conceivably, an extension of the fairness doctrine to product
commercials could have a chilling effect by involving the Commission
in day-to-day decisions that are at the heart of the commercially spon-
sored system of broadcasting. In other words, there is the fear of
unbridled agency discretion and a resulting potential for government
censorship.
These fears have led to the recent debate over the constitutionality
of the fairness doctrine.101 Yet whatever may be the merit of such chal-
1 00 An example of the difficulty in categorizing advertisements is the commercial which
raised fairness considerations in United People, Dayton, Ohio, 32 F.C.C.2d 124 (1971). At
issue was a television announcement advocating contributions to the local United Appeal.
The advertisement was institutional in the sense that it promoted the image of United
Appeal by emphasizing the organization's many worthwhile activities. But the advertise-
ment also promoted a product or service, that is, the use of a particular charity to dis-
tribute donations.
101 Challenges to the constitutionality of fairness regulation have focused primarily on
the soundness of the scarcity rationale and the doctrine's chilling effect. Among commen-
tators there has been widespread criticism of the scarcity rationale for differences in treat-
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lenges, 102 they bear no special relevance to the application of the fair-
ness doctrine to product commercials. The argument against the doc-
trine's continued viability applies to all aspects of the fairness doctrine
equally and provides no basis for singling out product commercials;
Moreover, ways exist to offset the dangers associated with expansive
governmental regulation.
One W'ay the FCC can alleviate the doctrine's potentially repres-
sive effect is to formulate clear standards as to what constitutes a con-
troversial issue of public importance. The model suggested herein for
applying the fairness doctrine to product advertising is a step in this
direction. The Commission can also adopt minimum standards for what'
will be considered a reasonable, good faith effort to air contrasting
opinion. These and other ascertainable guidelines would build safe-
guards into the doctrine that minimize the discretion of appointed agency
commissioners.0 3
meat between broadcasting and the print media. See, e.g., Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the
Tdecommunications Press, 1975 Dunx L.J. 213; Schenkkan, Power in the Marketplace of
Ideas: The Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment, 52 TExas L. REV. 727 (1974). Some
have pointed to the existence of cable television and its potential for alleviating limitations
inherent in the frequency spectrum. Those in favor of deregulation also note that broad-
cast frequencies are no more scarce than any other resource and the most efficient allocation
can be obtained, as in other industries, through the market. See, e.g., Coase, The Federal
Communications Commission, 2 J. LAw & EcoN. 1 (1959). A variation on the scarcity
theme was adopted by Professor Barron, who stresses the monopoly characteristics of the
broadcast media. See note 12 supra. Professor Barron's attempt to advance this-argument
with respect to the print media was rejected in The Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tor-
nillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
, Other justifications for distinguishing the broadcast media from the print media are
public ownership of the airwaves and the unique impact of the broadcast media. See gen-
erally R. NoLL, M. Pncx, & J. McGowAs,, Ecoxomac AsPects or rxvisroN PEGULATIOY
(1973). Perhaps the most satisfying distinction lies in the peculiar economic factors associ-
ated with advertiser-supported broadcasting. Because broadcast programs are sold to
advertisers in discrete time segments, the licensee is compelled to maximize his audience for
each time slot by airing only the most popular views and programs. FCC regulation thus
serves to protect minority interests and the general public interest in the free exchange of
information and ideas. Newspapers, on the other hand, are sold as a unit, so there is less
economic motivation to maximize readership for each page. In fact, publishers have an
economic incentive to give space to less popular topics, since those especially interested in
these areas will be encouraged to buy the entire publication. See generally Note, Regula-
tion of Program Content by the FCC, 77 HAnv. L. REv. 701 (1964).
As to the "chilling effect" of the fairness doctrine, recently documented instances of
government officials using the fairness doctrine as a tool to manipulate the media indicate
the very real threat posed by government censorship. See Schenkkan, Power in the Mar-
ketplace of Ideas: The Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment, 52 TexAs L. REv. 727
(1974). This has led some commentators to adopt a strict reading of the Constitution: as
between government censorship and private censorship, the Constitution plainly dictates
that the former is to be more feared.
.12 It is beyond the scope of this note to discuss the constitutionality of the fairness
doctrine, a subject which has already been given extensive treatment in the literature. See
note 101 supra. This discussion is predicated on the existing regulatory framework and the
constitutionality of the fairness doctrine as announced by Red Lion.
1 03 See note 90 supra & text accompanying.
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The dangers of unlimited agency discretion and the doctrine's po-
tential inhibitory effect are offset also by the fact that the broadcaster
retains substantial journalistic discretion. Under the present regulatory
scheme, the Commission is not entitled to substitute its judgment on
program content for that of the broadcast licensee.10 4 This limitation
was recently affirmed by the District of Columbia Circuit Court. Al-
though the decision was later vacated on rehearing because of moot-
ness, National Broadcasting Co., Iw. v. FCC"° prescribes the stan-
dard for FCC review of broadcaster compliance with the fairness doc-
trine. The Commission had concluded that a network's determination
concerning the subject matter of its documentary on pensions was un-
reasonable.1"6 Chiding the Commission for going beyond its scope of
review, the court stated that the agency's authority is strictly limited to
reviewing the licensee's decision for abuse of discretion.10 7 If this prin-
ciple is sustained in the future, broadcasters will have even less reason
to assert that the fairness doctrine has a chilling effect.
4. Achieving the Purpose of the Fairness Doctrine
Another concern expressed by the FCC is that counter-ads are
not likely to be informative and would result in abusive criticism rather
than intelligent debate. Although this concern is not without merit, it
too applies to all counter-advertising and certainly offers no basis for
isolating replies to product commercials from replies to editorial or
institutional advertising. Contrary to the Commission's contention, a
product commercial which projects a favorable image of a product does
in fact present one side of the product use issue. By promoting the
desirability of the product, the commercial affirmatively advocates its
use. Also, the Commission's contention that the counter-ad is not likely
to be informative overlooks the important role which the broadcaster
plays in selecting the rebuttal presentation. The licensee has the editorial
discretion to weed out abusive criticism and to select the spot announce-
ment that presents the opposing viewpoint in the most appropriate and
tasteful manner.1
08
10 4 The stated standard for review is whether the licensee has made a reasonable,
good faith determination. FAIRNESS REPORT, at 26375.
105 516 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rehearing en banc granted, 516 F.2d 1155 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), vacated on grounds of mootness, 516 F.2d 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
44 U.S.L.W. 3464 (U.S. Feb. 23, 1976).
106 In a memorandum opinion and order affirming the decision of its staff, the Com-
mission rejected NBC's determination that the subject of the documentary was "some
problems in some pension plans." It concluded that the "overwhelming weight" of the
"anti-pensions" statements required further presentation of contrasting views. Accuracy in
Media, 44 F.C.C.2d 1027 (1973).
107 516 F.2d at 1122-25, 1133.
208 See note 7 supra.
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5. Competing First Amendment Interests
Finally, there must be a balancing of the first amendment interests
which compete for broadcast time. The public's right to free speech and
to receive information must be weighed against the broadcaster's right
to independent journalistic discretion under the free press clause.
The FCC has stated that product advertising access would have
only marginal benefits in achieving first amendment goals, because prod-
uct promotion is not ordinarily associated with any of the interests which
the first amendment seeks to protect.10 9 That premise has now been
discredited. The Supreme Court in Bigelow explicitly confirmed that
speech related to the sale of products or services is not valueless in the
marketplace of ideas.110 Indeed, commercial expression is important in
many ways. As one commentator has noted, rational economic discrimi-
nation adds to the development of an individual's intellectual and ra-
tional capabilities, which are closely associated with the capacity to make
political decisions.:" Informed economic choice, which furthers the -so-
cial interest in the most efficient allocation of resources, is surely as valu-
able to a democratic capitalist society as informed political choice. More-
over, advertising aids the individual in achieving a materially satisfying
life by providing the consumer with a flow of essential information about
new products and services and the relative merits of competing products.
Iii this regard, advertising may have an even greater impact on the indi-
vidual's welfare than political decisions."'
These considerations, of course, must be examined in view of the
broadcaster's first amendment interest." 8 The purpose of the freedom
of the press clause is to protect independent journalistic discretion.
From one perspective, advertising access does not contravene the broad-
109See note 58 supra & text accompanying.
110421 U.S. at 826.
111 For these reasons, the writer proposes an alternative to Meiklejohn's view of the
first amendment. Although he also regards self-government as the goal of the first amend-
ment, he extends it to private as well as public self-government. See Redish, The First
Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression,
39 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 429, 439-45 (1971).
112For these reasons, the Supreme Court has now adopted the position that a free
flow of commercial information is indispensable to an informed citizen. Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1826-27
(1976).
11SIn the past the justification asserted for extending the fairness doctrine to product
commercials was that the broadcaster's commercial messages were not protected under the
first amendment and so fairness restrictions on his freedom in this area were permissible.
See, e.g., Banzhaf v. FCC 405 F.2d 1082, 1101-02 (D.C. Cir. 1968). By the same token,
saying commercial advertising is sufficient to trigger the public's right to know under the
first amendment must also mean that such advertising is sufficiently "speech" for the broad-
caster to receive first amendment protection. See note 82 supra.
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caster's editorial judgment because it only affects time allocation and
not what the broadcaster chooses to present on his own programming."1 4
However, even if the broadcaster's editorial judgment were implicated
in this area, the fairness doctrine model proposed herein would mini-
mize the infringement. By allowing fairness rebuttal only when the
product's use is a hotly debated political issue, the model has built-in
limitations along the lines suggested in Bigelow. Fairness would apply
only where the public's need to know is the greatest. Moreover, if there
is a question of weighing competing first amendment interests, the bal-
ance struck by Red Lion is controlling." 5 As interpreted by Red Lion,
the purpose of the first amendment is to secure truth in the marketplace
of ideas and to create a fully informed electorate. Red Lion's mandate
is clear: government-imposed fairness restrictions on the broadcaster
are lawful in order to protect the paramount interests of the public in
free expression.
CONCLUSION
As mediators for the competing interests in broadcast time, the
fairness doctrine and the agency charged with its administration have
had to walk a delicate tightrope. In announcing a change of fairness
policy with regard to product commercials, the FCC sought to sim-
plify this difficult task. The decision to remove product and service ad-
vertisements from fairness scrutiny was based on the assumption that
the public's first amendment right to robust debate does not extend to
commercial expression. The Supreme Court's rejection of that premise
in Bigelow v. Virginia casts serious doubts on the Commission's treat-
ment of product and service advertisements. Indeed, Bigelow suggests
that the statutory and constitutional parameters of the fairness doctrine
must now be redefined.
SUSAN T. EDLAVITCH
II4 Te opposed view is that the broadcaster's journalistic discretion is, in fact, nulli-
fied by the requirement of counter-time, because the station is being forced to share its
space with persons of the government's choosing. See Bazeon, FCC Regulation of the
Tekcommunications Press, 1975 Duxz L.J. 213, 235.
115See notes 44-53 supra & text accompanying.
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